Turing Test, Epistemic Views, and Intentional Stance
This document is complete
Due 10/19 by 11:59 PM.
For each numbered prompt and question set, the sum total of submitted sentences chould be
5 or fewer (so answers should be very brief). Strive for accuracy and clarity.
1. The Turing Test
Here is a characterization of the Turing Test:
A nonhuman system will be deemed intelligent if it acts so like an ordinary person with
respect to verbal behavior that ordinary people cannot tell that it is not an ordinary
(a) There are many different behavioral manifestations of intelligence. Why might
someone single out verbal behavior for a test such as Turing’s? (b) Why was Turing so
confident that a universal Turing machine could be programmed to pass the test?
2. Distinguishing Epistemic Views from Metaphysical Views
(a) What makes a view an epistemic view?
(b) What makes a view a metaphysical view?
(c) Formulate a version of behaviorism about the mind that is an epistemic view.
(d) Formulate a version of behaviorism about the mind that is a metaphysical view.
3. The Intentional Stance
According to Dennett, “all there is to being a true believer [i.e., an intentional system]
is being a system whose behavior is reliably predictable via the intentional strategy”
(Dennett True Believers, 72; brackets added).
Suppose I offer the following pseudo-Aristotelian theory in order to predict the behavior
of rocks and other heavy objects: Rocks and other heavy objects desire to return to the
earth from which they came. Hence, when they are thrown into the air, they return to
(a) What is the intentional strategy? (b) How does Dennett’s view avoid the consequence that rocks and other heavy objects really have desires as posited by the pseudoAristotelian view?